Officious Meddler or Ethical Advocate? Corporate Counsel\u27s Model Rule 1.13 Obligation to Report Up the Ladder: Defining  Related to the Representation by Motz, Christopher J.
University of St. Thomas Law Journal
Volume 10
Issue 1 Fall 2012 Article 10
2012
Officious Meddler or Ethical Advocate? Corporate
Counsel's Model Rule 1.13 Obligation to Report
Up the Ladder: Defining "Related to the
Representation"
Christopher J. Motz
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by UST Research Online and the University of St. Thomas Law Journal. For more information,
please contact lawjournal@stthomas.edu.
Bluebook Citation
Christopher J. Motz, Note, Officious Meddler or Ethical Advocate? Corporate Counsel's Model Rule 1.13 Obligation to Report Up the
Ladder: Defining "Related to the Representation", 10 U. St. Thomas L.J. 352 (2012).
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\10-1\UST110.txt unknown Seq: 1 13-NOV-13 13:04
NOTE
OFFICIOUS MEDDLER
OR ETHICAL ADVOCATE?
CORPORATE COUNSEL’S MODEL RULE 1.13
OBLIGATION TO REPORT UP THE LADDER:
DEFINING “RELATED TO THE
REPRESENTATION”
CHRISTOPHER J. MOTZ*
When a lawyer for a corporation knows of wrongdoing within the or-
ganization, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct trigger action by the
attorney. The contours of the trigger are coterminous with information
known to the corporate lawyer through his representation, as defined in
both Model Rules 1.6 (Confidentiality) and 1.13 (Organization As Client).
Each of these rules is essential to fully understanding the other, but on close
analysis their language is apparently conflicting. This Note argues that the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct use the phrase “related to the repre-
sentation” in Rule 1.13 with a substantively different meaning than their use
of the very similar phrase “relating to the representation” in Rule 1.6.
I. HYPOTHETICAL
Acme, Inc. is a growing medical technology company with offices in
several states and is currently involved in a product liability dispute with an
independent distributor. Acme hired Broad & Narrow, a reputable law firm,
to defend against all of the distributor’s claims that seem likely to go to
trial.  Broad & Narrow is working under the guidance of Mr. Gray, Acme’s
in-house counsel, who gave Broad & Narrow a massive electronic file con-
taining thousands of e-mails.  The e-mails were largely between Acme ex-
ecutives and its regional distributors, which Broad & Narrow needed in
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I am deeply grateful to Professor Neil W. Hamilton for his critique of this work and for his
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order to review all discoverable material and prepare for a potential trial,
although the e-mail file does not appear to have been assembled with care.
While looking through the thousands of e-mails, Broad & Narrow learn that
(1) Acme is almost certainly deliberately withholding some of the most
pertinent internal communication regarding the liability claim, contrary to
discovery rules; and (2) Acme’s medical director is not licensed.
Unsettled by their client’s seeming two-fold violation of the law and
unsure of what they are professionally bound or permitted to do, Broad &
Narrow consult their state’s ethics code, which has adopted the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct in full. Model Rule 1.13 “Organization as
Client” subsection (b) states:
If a lawyer for an organization knows that an officer, employee or
other person associated with the organization is engaged in ac-
tion, intends to act or refuses to act in a matter related to the
representation that is a violation of a legal obligation to the or-
ganization, or a violation of law that reasonably might be imputed
to the organization, and that is likely to result in substantial injury
to the organization, then the lawyer shall proceed as is reasonably
necessary in the best interest of the organization. Unless the law-
yer reasonably believes that it is not necessary in the best interest
of the organization to do so, the lawyer shall refer the matter to
higher authority in the organization, including, if warranted by
the circumstances to the highest authority that can act on behalf of
the organization as determined by applicable law.1
“My only question is this,” Broad says to Narrow, “which of the two
breaches are ‘related to the representation’? Because if Acme is breaking
the law and it’s related to our representation, it seems that according to 1.13
we have to take it up the ladder—at the very least we’ve got to go to Mr.
Gray with this.”
“Well,” Narrow responds, scratching her head, “we definitely have to
ask about those internal e-mails that are missing. They’re clearly inside our
lane—‘related to the representation,’ to quote the rule—but I don’t know
about that medical license stuff. It doesn’t have anything to do with the
litigation that we’re working on. I don’t think we have a duty to report it to
anybody.”
“Hmm, this is confusing,” answers Broad as he continues to flip
through the Model Rules. “Rule 1.6 ‘Confidentiality of Information’ uses
similar language to 1.13. It reads, ‘a lawyer shall not reveal information
1. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (2010) (emphasis added). There are four
elements that must be met before the “shall” provision is triggered: it must be a (1) “matter related
to the representation”; (2) “violation of a legal obligation”; (3) “that reasonably might be imputed
to the organization”; and (4) “is likely to result in substantial injury to the organization.” The
focus of this Note is element (1). In dealing with the first element while contemplating the hypo-
thetical above, I assume that elements (2), (3), and (4) are met. I call these three elements the
“harm threshold” of Rule 1.13.
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relating to the representation of a client.’ This keeps us from revealing all
information ‘relating to the representation,’ absent some pretty narrow ex-
ceptions. That seems really broad—it protects everything we might learn
about a client relating to the representation. Does 1.13 mean to use the
phrase ‘related to the representation’ in the same way? If it does, would it
require that we go up the ladder on each of these issues? Or is it possible
that something is not sufficiently ‘related to the representation’ to warrant a
Rule 1.13 duty to report up the corporate ladder, and is also not ‘relating to
the representation’ enough to warrant the Rule 1.6 duty of attorney-client
confidentiality? That doesn’t seem like a correct reading of the two rules.
Do the ‘related to the representation’ phrases mean different things in each
rule?”
II. INTRODUCTION
If there was ever a time for corporate soul-searching, it was the years
following the collapse of Enron and WorldCom in 2001 and 2002. Their
embarrassing frauds have been widely commented on and will not be re-
counted here. However, we must not forget that lawyers were very near the
center of it all, and issues of professional responsibility in the corporate
context warrant continuing scrutiny.
Even before the details of the massive scandals were fleshed out, peo-
ple wanted to know “where were the lawyers?”2 Examining this question,
the American Bar Association Task Force on Corporate Responsibility
studied anew two age-old duties lawyers owe to organizational clients: to
keep confidences and to protect from harm.3 The Task Force acknowledged
that “[i]t is not clear . . . what the [Model Rules of Professional Conduct]
permit the lawyer to disclose upon learning of corporate misconduct
through confidential consultation with a corporate officer,”4 and it made
several recommendations—subsequently adopted—that attempt to clarify
what lawyers must or may do in such situations.5
2. See, e.g., Bernard Carrey, Enron—Where Were the Lawyers?, 27 VT. L. REV. 871,
871–72 (2003); New Jersey Commission on Professionalism in the Law, New Jersey State Bar
Association, Standing Up to Corruption and Greed, 211 N.J. LAW., Apr. 2003, at 42; Lawrence
Hamermesh, Corporate Responsibility in Real Time: The Work (So Far) of the ABA Task Force
on Corporate Responsibility, 21 DEL. LAW. 18, Spring 2003, at 21 (discussing the question
“where were the lawyers” in the context of the role of the ABA Task Force on Corporate Respon-
sibility, which was formed after the Enron scandal).
3. Preliminary Report of the American Bar Association Task Force on Corporate Responsi-
bility, 58 BUS. LAW. 189, Nov. 2002, at 203–207.
4. Id. at 205.
5. See ABA Res. Nos. 119A–119B, House of Delegates, Annual Meeting 12–13 (Aug.
11–12, 2003),   http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/leadership/2003/2003jour
nal.authcheckdam.pdf; see also ABA Res. No. 119B, House of Delegates, Annual Meeting, Re-
port 3–6 (Aug. 11–12, 2003), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/leadership/
2003/journal/119b.authcheckdam.pdf (providing the proposed comments for Rule 1.13, which
were adopted by the ABA).
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It succeeds in many important ways, but the Task Force missed one
important detail of textual dissonance between two key ethical rules.
Through its focus on corporate decision making, it refined and clarified the
duties owed by a general counsel, but it failed to answer a question more
relevant to the numerous attorneys employed by corporations as outside
counsel: What are an outside counsel’s obligations when confronted with
misconduct that falls beyond the immediate purview of his assigned task—
in other words, is “outside his lane”? Rule 1.6 of the Model Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct (“Model Rules” or “Rules”) binds lawyers to near-abso-
lute confidentiality regarding all information “relating to the representation”
of a client. If the client is a corporation, Model Rule 1.13 further binds
lawyers to refer to corporate authorities certain misconduct by employees or
officers in matters “related to the representation,” and allows disclosure
outside the organization in some limited circumstances, even if it might
otherwise violate the confidentiality mandated by Model Rule 1.6. The sim-
ilar language in each of these rules can be confusing when viewed in light
of the other. This confusion is often overlooked, perhaps because most
practicing attorneys have well-honed instincts for ethical behavior, rather
than a rote adherence to the text. If a lawyer representing an organization
becomes aware of impropriety within the organization, but not in a matter
sufficiently “related to the representation” to trigger his 1.13 duty, is that
information “relating to the representation” such that it deserves Rule 1.6
protection? What exactly does Model Rule 1.13 mean by “related to the
representation”?
In this Note, I seek to analyze the interplay of Model Rule 1.13(b) with
Rule 1.6(a), and analyze two possible interpretations of Rule 1.13’s “related
to the representation.” Specifically, in addressing the above hypothetical, I
consider whether Broad & Narrow must go up the ladder at Acme, Inc. with
their knowledge of each instance of wrongdoing. I will discuss both what I
view as the minimum required of Broad & Narrow under the Model Rules
and the aspirational ethic for the firm as outside counsel. There is a surpris-
ing lack of scholarship addressing the particular question of what an outside
counsel may be obligated or allowed to do when it comes to discovery of
corporate wrongdoing that is not directly related to the legal matter he is
handling—“outside his lane,” as many call it.6
The result of my analysis is that the phrase “matter related to the repre-
sentation” in Rule 1.13(b) has a completely different meaning than the use
6. Although understandably motivated by the large corporate scandals, the Task Force on
Corporate Responsibility focuses on the duties of an in-house general counsel to the detriment of
outlining the duties owed by outside counsel. See ABA Res. No. 119A, House of Delegates,
Annual Meeting, Report, Section II, 9–12 (Aug. 11–12, 2003),   http://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/migrated/leadership/2003/journal/119a.authcheckdam.pdf. The “related to the
representation” language predates the 2003 changes, but is of arguably greater import to decision
making by outside counsel than the updated language itself.
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of the phrase “information relating to the representation” in Rule 1.6(a). I
conclude that Rule 1.13’s use of the phrase should be construed narrowly
insofar as it establishes a trigger for up-the-ladder reporting. As such, I
offer a draft comment to modify Comment 6 to Rule 1.13 that addresses the
differentiation between each phrase and clarifies how attorneys are bound to
act when representing organizations, particularly as outside counsel.7
III. INTENT OF RULES 1.6 AND 1.13 AND THE 2003 CHANGES
The law profession’s ethics rules seek to strike a balance between the
characteristic of trustworthiness—built upon the ability to keep confi-
dences—and the trait of independence, which is necessary for an “officer of
the legal system” having a “special responsibility for the quality of jus-
tice.”8 It will be important to keep this theme in mind as we consider the
obligations Rules 1.6 and 1.13 impose upon lawyers representing organiza-
tions. Considered together, these rules demand that lawyers keep secrets as
a member of the corporate team while simultaneously performing a gate-
keeper function with independent judgment.
A lawyer’s obligation to maintain strict confidence with his clients is a
“core value” of the legal profession.9 It is granted privilege under the Law
of Evidence10 and has been continuously enshrined in the rules of profes-
sional ethics since at least 1908.11 The 1969 Code of Professional Responsi-
bility defined the duty succinctly: “[A] person who entrusts legal matters to
a lawyer is protected by the attorney-client privilege and by the duty of the
lawyer to hold inviolate the confidences and secrets of his client.”12 The
1969 Code also seeks to keep lawyers professionally independent, even
7. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13 cmt. 6. Comment 6 is the first of three
comments addressing Rule 1.13’s relation to other rules.
8. Id. at Preamble.
9. Katherine L. Harrison, Multidisciplinary Practices: Changing the Global View of the
Legal Profession, 21 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 879, 891 (2000).
10. FED. R. EVID. 502; see also Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981) (for a
discussion of the attorney-client privilege in the context of corporations and their employees); 8
WIGMORE EVIDENCE § 2290 (McNaughton rev. 1961) (explaining the history of the privilege of
confidentiality).
11. Harry I. Subin, The Lawyer as Superego: Disclosure of Client Confidences to Prevent
Harm, 70 IOWA L. REV. 1091, 1107 (1985).
12. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 3-3 (1980). The code defines “confidence”
as referring to information protected by the attorney-client privilege under applicable law, and
“secret” as referring to other information gained in the professional relationship that the client has
requested be held inviolate or the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would be likely to
be detrimental to the client. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(A)(1980). Ac-
cording to one scholar, “the term ‘secret,’ while broadly construed, is limited to information about
the client ‘gained in the professional relationship’”; thus, the Model Rules arguably grant broader
protection than the Code because “information outside of the professional relationship is also
protected, so long as it relates to the relationship.” Subin, supra note 11, at 1150 n.305 (citing
MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(A)(1969) and MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CON-
DUCT R. 1.6 (1983)).
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when employed by and representing organizations.13 The current incarna-
tion of lawyers’ ethics norms were first adopted in 1983 as the Model Rules
of Professional Conduct. Most recently bearing on the tension between
trustworthiness and independence, the Model Rules were amended in 2003
in the wake of serious and well-publicized corporate fraud scandals.
The subject of intense debate, amended Rule 1.6 was approved by a
vote of 218–201, and the new Rule 1.13 passed by a margin of 239–147.14
The new Rule 1.6 allows greater opportunity for disclosure of confidential
information, and the new Rule 1.13 now mandates up-the-ladder reporting
in certain situations, rather than merely allowing it. Of particular impor-
tance to an analysis of Rules 1.6 and 1.13 is the theme of tension between
trustworthiness and independent judgment, which form the basis for a law-
yer’s obligations to his corporate client.
IV. DEFINING THE TERMS
The meaning of the words “related to the representation” as used in
Model Rule 1.13(b) bear directly upon how an organization’s outside attor-
ney must or may treat an organization’s confidential information. A full
understanding of this phrase, in order to alleviate confusion in its meaning,
must necessarily begin with defining individual terms and phrases in Model
Rule 1.13(b).
(1) “A lawyer for an organization.” Obviously, this person may be
either inside or outside counsel.15 It is important to note that both are in-
cluded. Although the rule may impose obligations differing in degree—e.g.,
the up-the-ladder duty may potentially be triggered sooner for in-house
counsel—the duty still exists for outside lawyers.16
13. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-24 (1980). (“Where a lawyer is employed
by an organization, a written agreement that defines the relationship between him and the organi-
zation and provides for his independence is desirable since it may serve to prevent misunderstand-
ing as to their respective roles.”). However, the Model Code had no direct counterpart to Model
Rule 1.13. RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN S. DZIENKOWSKI, LEGAL ETHICS, LAW. DESKBK. PROF.
RESP. § 1.13 (2012–13).
14. See ABA Res. Nos. 119A–119B, House of Delegates, Annual Meeting 12–13 (Aug.
11–12, 2003), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/leadership/2003/journal/
119a.authcheckdam.pdf.
15. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(a) (stating that “[a] lawyer employed or
retained by an organization represents the organization . . . .”) (emphasis added). By its plain
meaning, this may include inside or outside lawyers for a corporation. The conclusion that both
inside and outside counsel are included in the term “lawyer for an organization” is affirmed by
Comment 19 to Rule 1.8, which prohibits intimate relationships between certain constituents of an
organization and “a lawyer for the organization (whether inside counsel or outside counsel).”
16. See E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo, The Tensions, Stresses, and Profes-
sional Responsibilities of the Lawyer for the Corporation, 62 BUS. LAW. 1, 22 (2006) (noting that
“[i]n-house counsel, and the general counsel in particular, usually have a deeper and broader
knowledge of the client’s business than do outside counsel.”); see also Geoffrey C. Hazard, Ethi-
cal Dilemmas of Corporate Counsel, 46 EMORY L.J. 1011, 1019 (1997) (emphasizing the differ-
ence between inside and outside counsel: “To put the point bluntly, a lawyer in independent
practice is sheltered from the informal, back-channel information that flows around the company
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(2) “Knows.” This denotes actual knowledge of the fact in question. A
person’s knowledge may be inferred from circumstances.17 What might de-
note actual knowledge in any situation is impossible to define precisely
with a general rule, as here. However, allowing knowledge to be inferred
from circumstances permits room for intelligent judgment. Further,
“knows” obliges a higher burden than “reasonable belief,” a phrase used
elsewhere in the Model Rules.18 Rule 1.13 has a knowledge component
whereas Rule 1.6 does not.
(3) “Matter.” This word immediately precedes and qualifies the phrase
“related to the representation” in Model Rule 1.13(b). Neither Model Rule
1.0 (Terminology) nor 1.13 defines “matter,” although it is used seventy-
two times in the Model Rules and comments. In various instances, “matter”
has a meaning suggestive of a point of law or fact.19 Elsewhere in the
Model Rules it is used to mean a case, controversy, or legal task on which a
lawyer may work.20 Courts have variously said that a “matter” is the sub-
stantial facts upon which an attorney may base a claim or a defense,21 or
that it is the particular subject of litigation—the cause for which an action is
brought.22 These judicial definitions roughly parallel the way “matter” is
used in the Model Rules. Whichever of the meanings of “matter” used in
the Rules is meant in Rule 1.13, it arguably has a narrower connotation than
the term “information” as used in Rule 1.6.
(4) “Related to the representation.” This phrase is not defined by the
rules. Significantly, it is conditioned by the preceding and following
clauses, so that only certain types of “matters” related to the representation
of a client will trigger the mandatory reporting outlined in Rule 1.13. The
Model Rules’ use of this exact language in Rule 1.13 is confusing because
it is almost the exact same as the phrase “relating to the representation,” as
water cooler. Instead, engagement of an independent law firm is necessarily predicated on a distil-
lation of the facts about the matter in question.”).
17. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.0(f).
18. Id. at 1.0(i) (“‘Reasonable belief’ . . . when used in reference to a lawyer denotes that the
lawyer believes the matter in question and that the circumstances are such that the belief is reason-
able.”). “Reasonable belief” is the burden a lawyer must meet under Model Rule 1.6 for permis-
sive disclosure in the narrow circumstances outlined in 1.6(b)(1)–(6). Contrast this with the Model
Rule 1.13(b) requirement that a lawyer “know” of harmful wrongdoing before he is required to
report up within a corporation.
19. Id. at Scope [15] (outlining the context for understanding the role of lawyers, the Scope
says to look at “statutes relating to matters of licensure”); id. at 1.0(i) (stating “‘reasonable be-
lief’ . . . when used in reference to a lawyer denotes that the lawyer believes the matter in
question”).
20. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, Preamble [3] (providing that attorneys may at times
be neutral third-parties rather than advocates, helping others solve a “dispute or other matter”); id.
at 1.0(k) (stating that “‘[s]creened’ denotes the isolation of a lawyer from any participation in a
matter”).
21. Boucher v. Pure Oil Co., 101 So. 2d 408, 410 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1958) (citing Black’s
Law Dictionary).
22. Quinault Tribe v. Gallagher, 368 F.2d 648, 654 (9th Cir. 1966) (defining “matter in
controversy”).
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used in Rule 1.6.23 Given this, there are two possible interpretations of “re-
lated to the representation” in Rule 1.13. Below, I first present an argument
for a broad interpretation of the phrase, and then secondly address a narrow
interpretation. I conclude that the twin phrases are indeed used differently—
broadly in Rule 1.6 and narrowly in Rule 1.13.
V. ANALYSIS OF “RELATED TO THE REPRESENTATION”
A. Broad Interpretation
The broad interpretation of the phrase relies upon the profession’s
clear understanding of what is “information relating to the representation”
according to Rule 1.6. This view equates Rule 1.13’s language with Rule
1.6’s such that if an attorney knows of wrongdoing by an officer or em-
ployee of a corporate client, and that knowledge is sufficiently “relating to
the representation” to warrant Rule 1.6 confidentiality, that knowledge is
also “related to the representation” under Rule 1.13 and triggers Rule 1.13’s
up-the-ladder analysis.24 Under this interpretation, Broad & Narrow’s Rule
1.13 up-the-ladder duties are triggered for both of the known instances of
wrongdoing (assuming the wrongdoing also meets the “harm threshold”25),
even though the medical licensure issue is not related to the attorneys’ spe-
cific work assignment.26 But under this broad interpretation, how is the re-
23. One state’s version of the Model Rules defines this term of art. The OREGON RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.0(f) (2012), which closely mirror the American Bar Association’s Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, states: “‘Information relating to the representation of a client’
denotes both information protected by the attorney-client privilege under applicable law, and other
information gained in a current or former professional relationship that the client has requested be
held inviolate or the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would be likely to be detri-
mental to the client.” However, this definition seems both circular and vague, essentially saying
that information meets the threshold for being protected if (1) it is protected and (2) the client
would not want it revealed.
24. This conclusion is based upon the textual canon of construction ejusdem generis, which
holds that things “of the same kind” are all included in the same class. Jacob Scott, Codified
Canons and the Common Law of Interpretation, 98 GEO. L.J. 341, 352 n.44 (2010). Here, I as-
sume that Rule 1.6’s use establishes the meaning of the class rather than Rule 1.13 simply because
I believe the confidentiality rule to be both clearer and longer established as a norm. See, e.g.,
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 59 (2000). The Model Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct Rule 1.8(b) also uses a similar phrase. It prohibits a lawyer from using “infor-
mation relating to representation of a client” to the client’s disadvantage without consent. MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(b). This usage has a broad meaning that is interchangeable
with Rule 1.6’s use.
25. “Harm Threshold,” as defined in supra note 1, occurs when elements 2–4 of Rule 1.13
are met.
26. Whether or not a matter is related to an attorney’s work assignment is difficult to define,
and necessarily requires some level of subjective judgment. Several factors ought to be consid-
ered: Is the lawyer outside or inside counsel? What are the length and scope of the representation?
What is the level of the attorney’s exposure to and work on other legal services and tasks for the
corporation? In considering the overall decision on whether to report up-the-ladder, Comment 4 to
Rule 1.13—newly added in 2002—lists several factors: “the lawyer should give due consideration
to [(1)] the seriousness of the violation”; (2) “the responsibility in the organization and apparent
motivation of [the purported wrongdoer]”; (3) “the policies of the organization concerning such
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lationship between an attorney’s knowledge of client wrongdoing and the
attorney’s representation of a client evaluated?
The Model Rules offer no guidance, although common sense sheds
light on the duty of confidentiality. No practitioner would deny that Rule
1.6 binds Broad & Narrow to keep confidential their knowledge of each of
the two issues listed in the hypotheticals (unless a 1.6(b) or 1.13(c) permis-
sive exception applies). All would agree that each of the two matters is
sufficiently “relating to the representation”—each stems from action taken
by the corporation through its agents, and Broad & Narrow only came to
the knowledge through their representation.27 Under the broad interpreta-
tion, because they are bound by Rule 1.6 to protect this information, it fol-
lows that Broad & Narrow have an obligation to report these matters up-
the-ladder (assuming they also determine that the harm threshold is met).
This view, however, has minimal support within the legal profession.28
Unfortunately, there is little case law to further guide an analysis.29
The D.C. Circuit, in deciding whether a lawyer’s dishonesty was “related to
the representation,” discussed only practice-related versus non-practice-re-
lated dishonesty, concluding that all practice-related actions are “related to
the representation.”30 This supports the broad interpretation.
A structural analysis of Rule 1.13 in its entirety also supports this con-
clusion. Consider the following: 1.13(c) grants a narrow exception to the
strictures of Rule 1.6 confidentiality. Subsection (c) permits an attorney to
disclose otherwise confidential information if he first reports wrongdoing
matters”; and (4) “any other relevant considerations.” Moreover, “[u]nless the lawyer reasonably
believes it is not necessary in the best interest of the organization” immediately precedes the “shall
refer” mandate in Rule 1.13(b), granting a wide berth for discretionary judgment.
27. This is a “but for” approach to understanding what information is relating to the represen-
tation sufficient to earn 1.6 protection. If the attorney would not have the knowledge “but for” his
representation, that knowledge is confidential.
28. See Thomas G. Wilkinson Jr., Confidential Communications of an Organizational Client,
34 PA. LAW., Jan.–Feb. 2012, at 52 (supporting my broad interpretation, a Pennsylvania Bar Asso-
ciation Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility Committee advisory opinion said the follow-
ing to a municipal attorney who received a question from an organizational constituent regarding
the legality of bringing a firearm to a city meeting: “Having determined that the communications
were confidential, inquirer was further advised that if inquirer had reason to believe that the mem-
ber’s actions in bringing a weapon to a municipal meeting could be imputed to the municipality or
might result in substantial injury to the municipality, inquirer should proceed as is reasonably
necessary in the best interests of the municipality per Rule 1.13(b).”). This might suggest a broad
interpretation, however, the city attorney here is essentially an inside counsel, so arguably all
issues that pertain to the organization’s constituents are related to his representation.
29. Neither the ABA nor the bar associations of California, Illinois, Florida, the District of
Columbia, Delaware, or New York published any advisory opinions that contribute to a definition
of “related to the representation.”
30. In re Kennedy, 542 A.2d 1225, 1229–30 (D.C. 1988). Model Rule 8.4(c) holds it is
professional misconduct for lawyers to engage in dishonest conduct. Of course, under the Model
Rules, all attorney dishonesty is professional misconduct. The court merely used the phrase “re-
lated to representation” in order to measure the weight of the offense, finding here that practice-
related dishonesty qualifies as related to representation.
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all the way up-the-ladder to no avail and if he “reasonably believes” the
corporation will suffer substantial injury as a result.31 Rule 1.13(d) says that
subsection (c)’s permissive disclosure may not be invoked “with respect to
information relating to a lawyer’s representation of an organization to in-
vestigate an alleged violation of law”—essentially, a lawyer hired for the
purpose of conducting an internal investigation is not permitted to report
outside the corporation under 1.13(c).32 By explicitly saying that attorneys
charged with investigating claims of alleged violations of law may not act
pursuant to 1.13(c), the Rule is implicitly saying that in an instance where
an attorney not charged with investigating violations, but who nevertheless
discovers such violations, may invoke the permissive grant of Rule
1.13(c).33
To employ 1.13(c), an attorney must first survive the four elements of
1.13(b), which bind him to the mandatory up-the-ladder reporting require-
ment. One of those four elements, of course, is that it be a “matter related to
the representation.” Therefore, a claim of an alleged violation of law that an
attorney inadvertently stumbles upon, even if completely unrelated to the
attorney’s work assignment, is a “matter related to the representation.” This
conclusion is also consistent with the broad interpretation.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), enacted only a year before
Rule 1.13 and containing a similar provision, further supports the notion
that the ABA House of Delegates intended the “shall refer” provision of
Model Rule 1.13 to include a broad swath of what is “related to the repre-
sentation.”  SOX mandated that the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) write a rule “requiring an attorney [that appears before the SEC] to
report evidence of a material violation of securities law or breach of fiduci-
ary duty or similar violation by the company or any agent thereof, to the
chief legal counsel or the chief executive officer of the company,” and if
31. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(c). This permitted disclosure can be grouped
with the other valid reasons for revealing confidences outlined in Rule 1.6(b). Interestingly, one
scholar complains that Rule 1.13(c), as amended in the most recent updates to the Rules, is totally
impotent. He argues that because it serves to protect the corporation from harm it might suffer as a
result of its misconduct (harm presumably from public relations fallout or criminal or civil liabil-
ity), rather than a third party whom the misconduct would directly harm, the provision only allows
lawyers to report things that are likely to become public anyhow. Monroe H. Freedman, The
“Corporate Watch Dogs” That Can’t Bark: How The New ABA Ethical Rules Protect Corporate
Fraud, 8 D.C. L. REV. 225, 230–31 (2004).
32. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(d). This also applies to lawyers defending
organizations against a “claim arising out of an alleged violation of law.”
33. This inference is based upon the textual canon of construction expressio unius, which
holds that the inclusion of one thing indicates the exclusion of others not mentioned. Scott, supra
note 24, at 352 n.42 (citing Tate v. Ogg, 195 S.E. 496, 499 (Va. 1938) (holding that where a
statute applied to “any horse, mule, cattle, hog, sheep or goat,” it did not apply to turkeys) (inter-
nal quotations omitted)).
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these persons do not adequately respond to the report, then to report it to the
board of directors.34
Although these regulations closely mirror the up-the-ladder require-
ments of Rule 1.13, SOX does not use the “related to the representation”
language, but instead places upon securities lawyers the duty to report all
securities misconduct they discover. Given the massive public recoil from
corporate scandals in the preceding several years, the ABA, in the interest
of maintaining the public trust for the profession, had much incentive to
amend Rule 1.13. By broadly mandating up-the-ladder reporting of wrong-
doing, the ABA marched lockstep with what Congress required of SEC
lawyers through SOX.35 This suggests a broad interpretation of what is “re-
lated to the representation.”
Lastly, consider the underlying policies of Rules 1.6 and 1.13. Rule 1.6
prohibits lawyers from betraying clients; it is meant to set a solid founda-
tion for “the trust that is the hallmark of the client-lawyer relationship.”36
Serving this purpose, the rule offers an ample blanket of protection cover-
ing information relating to the relationship. Rule 1.13 unequivocally names
organizations as clients and requires lawyers to act in the organizations’
best interest.37 The organization surely has an interest in addressing wrong-
doing where it exists within its own confines. It would seem contrary to this
purpose if the up-the-ladder mandate of 1.13(b) allowed an organization’s
lawyer with knowledge of wrongdoing to keep that information to himself.
With this in mind, Rule 1.6’s broad interpretation seems appropriate in Rule
1.13.
B. Narrow Interpretation
The second possible interpretation of “related to the representation” is
far narrower. This interpretation restricts the category of what might trigger
up-the-ladder reports under Rule 1.13 to only those things relating to the
actual work assignment or specific task of the attorney. This narrow inter-
pretation would require Broad & Narrow to report up-the-ladder the miss-
34. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 307, 15 U.S.C. § 7245(1) (2006). The SEC’s up-the-lad-
der regulation went into place in February 2003. 17 C.F.R. § 205.1 (2003).
35. See Catharine E. Stark, Regulating Corporate Governance: Amended Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct Allow Lawyers to Make the World a More Ethical Place, 53 CATH. U. L. REV.
1195, 1195–96 (2004) (describing the adoption of the SEC standards by the ABA within a week
of their taking effect).
36. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 2.
37. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13 cmts. 3–4. There exists the temptation to
view the report-out language of Rule 1.13(c) as the primary “gatekeeper” provision. However,
1.13(c)’s safety-valve effect does not define the policy underlying the entire rule. A lawyer best
acts as a gatekeeper with special responsibilities to the public by influencing his client through
persuasion. See Neil W. Hamilton, Ethical Leadership in Professional Life, 6 U. ST. THOMAS L.J.
358, 358–59 (2009) (“Among the private-sector gatekeeper occupations . . . the legal profession
plays a uniquely important role . . . . The responsibility to persuade and influence [corporate
clients] pursuant to a lawyer’s independent professional judgment is a form of leadership.”).
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ing e-mails, but not the medical licensure issue (assuming the latter has no
bearing on the current litigation). The Lawyer’s Deskbook on Professional
Responsibility supports this interpretation:
The text of Rule 1.13 seems to limit the lawyer’s obligation to act
only to cases in which the misconduct of constituent is connected
“to a matter related to the representation” by the lawyer.  In other
words, if the lawyer for the organization represents the client in a
narrow matter, the obligation only arises with respect to constitu-
ent action related to the matter and not other matters generally.
There is no general obligation for a lawyer to be an officious
meddler.38
This conclusion—that what is “related to the representation” under
Rule 1.13 is far different than what qualifies under Rule 1.6—is supported
by understanding the different intents of each rule. Rule 1.6 is substantive
and Rule 1.13 is procedural. Because the function of Rule 1.6 is to offer
substantive protection from public disclosure, it must widely cover as much
information as it can. This is necessary in order to shield clients and mini-
mize their fear of betrayal. It must define a category of information in order
to meet its intent of keeping secret things secret. In contrast, the purpose of
Rule 1.13 is procedural. By establishing a category of things “related to the
representation,” it offers very limited substantive protection, instead outlin-
ing when a certain internal procedure must occur. In other words, it defines
a triggering event. A narrow interpretation of the phrase is better suited to
serving this procedural end.39
A structural argument also supports this conclusion. Comment 6 to
Rule 1.13 addresses Rule 1.13’s relation to Rule 1.6, and it also uses the
words “information relating to the representation.”40 It advises that Rule
1.13(c) is similar to Rule 1.6(b) in that it provides additional permissive
disclosure exceptions. It qualifies this comparison, however, by stating that
Rule 1.13(c) “does not modify” the grant contained in 1.6(b). This suggests
that any terms common to both 1.13 and 1.6 have different meanings. If the
category of “information relating to the representation” mentioned by Com-
ment 6 to Rule 1.13 did not have a different meaning than that contem-
plated by Rule 1.6, why would it explicitly say that 1.13(c) does not modify
1.6(b)? If the comment had remained silent on this point, lawyers would be
free to understand the “relating to the representation” categories in Rules
1.6 and 1.13 as if they were the same. Comment 6’s modification prohibi-
38. ROTUNDA & DZIENKOWSKI, supra note 13, at § 1.13–2(b). This is the only identified
work that addresses the question precisely and directly.
39. See Francis Lieber, Legal and Political Hermeneutics, or Principles of Interpretation and
Construction in Law and Politics, With Remarks on Precedents and Authorities, 16 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1989, 2003 n.24 (1995) (“Quotiens idem sermo duas sententias exprimit, ea potissimum
accipiatur, quae rei gerendae aptior est. ‘Whenever the same words express two meanings, that is
to be adopted which is the better fitted for carrying out the proposed end.’”).
40. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13 cmt. 6.
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tion prevents this, which is consistent with a narrow interpretation of the
phrase.
Additionally, the words accompanying “related to the representation”
in Rule 1.13 suggest that it has a narrower meaning.41 A lawyer must
“know” of misconduct in a “matter” related to their representation. Model
Rule 1.6 places no requirement on the level of an attorney’s awareness—it
simply protects all information, whether of a single fact or a complex situa-
tion. Here, Rule 1.13 requires that a corporate lawyer “know” of miscon-
duct—a word that indicates that the lawyer must be able to assimilate
multiple facts about a given situation and form a clear understanding that
wrongdoing is occurring.42 This places upon the lawyer a higher burden
than a “reasonable belief” requirement and is certainly more difficult than
possessing a single fact. Also, a “matter” has a different meaning than “in-
formation.” “Matter” is a more precise term than “information,” regardless
of which of the meanings one understands Rule 1.13 to be using from the
two connotations used elsewhere in the Model Rules.43 If one accepts this,
it follows that while all matters contemplated by Rule 1.13 are covered by
Rule 1.6 protections, not all information receiving Rule 1.6 protection trig-
gers the Rule 1.13 process. This affirms a narrow interpretation.
VI. THE NARROW INTERPRETATION IS CORRECT
The broad interpretation, if correct, produces a result that is logically
untenable. Thus, coupled with the above rationale, the narrow interpretation
is right. Under the broad interpretation, “related to the representation” in
Rule 1.13(b) has the same meaning as “relating to the representation” in
Rule 1.6(a), such that if a particular piece of information about a corporate
client must be maintained in confidence, it also must be reported up-the-
ladder if the harm threshold is met. But, this means that all misconduct that
meets the harm threshold must be reported. To conclude otherwise would
be to recognize that some knowledge of wrongdoing does not trigger the
“shall refer” duty, and that this knowledge does not warrant Rule 1.6 pro-
tection. This conclusion cannot be correct. It would remove any possibility
that misconduct a corporate lawyer discovers while working is not related
to his representation of the organization and undermines the trust-building
intent of Rule 1.6.
41. Scott, supra note 24 at 362 (“Where the language of statutes varies, that variance should
be given meaning.”).
42. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.0(f). (“A person’s knowledge may be in-
ferred from circumstances” suggests that knowledge is more than simply possessing a single fact.
It may require analyzing a complex situation in its entirety in order to form a coherent and accu-
rate picture of the truth).
43. From “Defining the Terms”, supra Part IV, the two possibilities are that a “matter” may
be the case, task, or legal assignment that an attorney is engaged with, or the substantial facts upon
which a claim or defense is based.
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If all misconduct must be reported up-the-ladder, as the broad interpre-
tation suggests, why does Rule 1.13 even bother to add the phrase “related
to the representation”? A broad duty to report all misconduct would be just
as clearly defined without this wording. The only reason the phrase is nec-
essary is because it means something other than it does in Rule 1.6(a). The
mandatory “shall refer” duty, heightened in relation to its permissive nature
prior to 2003, only applies to malfeasance that is related to the task or as-
signment upon which the attorney is working, has oversight on, or is other-
wise responsible for. The narrow interpretation of “related to the
representation” in Rule 1.13(b) is correct.
Under the proper, narrow interpretation, Broad & Narrow is bound to
report up-the-ladder regarding the e-mails that are missing. Not only are
they bound to report the e-mails’ absence, but they also must report any
other knowledge that they inferred from the circumstance, such as particular
correspondence that are missing. Broad & Narrow are not bound to report
up-the-ladder regarding the medical licensure issue.44 Their situation is dis-
tinguishable from that of Mr. Gray, whose employment by Acme, Inc. as
inside counsel confers upon him a far wider category of what is related to
his representation. If he has the same knowledge of wrongdoing as Broad &
Narrow, he is bound to report up-the-ladder regarding both issues, even
possibly all the way to the board of directors, if no appropriate action is
taken at a lower level.
As a matter of aspirational ethics, Broad & Narrow ought to report up-
the-ladder regarding both issues.45 The Model Rules highlight the legal pro-
fession’s obligations to a client as being broader than what is mandated or
limited by the Rules.46 Trust builds upon open communication, and while
Broad & Narrow do not want to develop a reputation as “officious med-
dlers,” they do want to set the tone within their attorney-client relationship
that the best interests of the client maintain a place of primacy. A lawyer
ought to consider how well he is managing the risk to his client’s reputation
44. In an odd twist on this interplay between Model Rules 1.6 and 1.13, the medical licensure
issue would not trigger mandatory up-the-ladder reporting under 1.13, but if Broad & Narrow
deemed that the issue was reasonably certain to cause substantial bodily harm (admittedly a very
high threshold), they could permissively disclose outside the organization under Rule 1.6(b)—
without having first reported up. Such an event, however rare, is conceivable under the Model
Rules.
45. They may report up-the-ladder regarding the medical issue, even though the Rules them-
selves no longer address permissive reporting. It is now addressed in the comment. MODEL RULES
OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13 cmt. 4 (“[A] lawyer may bring to the attention of an organizational
client, including its highest authority, matters that the lawyer reasonably believes to be of suffi-
cient importance to warrant doing so in the best interest of the organization.”). The decision to do
so is not governed by the Rules, but rather is determined by Broad & Narrow’s own professional
judgment. The second sentence of the proposed draft comment highlights the permission to report
up-the-ladder.
46. See Hamilton, supra note 37, at 367 (discussing the Model Rules Preamble’s social con-
tract for lawyers as counselors and Rule 2.1’s exhortation to lawyers to provide candid advice).
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through the advice he gives or chooses to not give, taking into account his
client’s long-term enlightened self-interest.47 From a business leader’s per-
spective, I would want my legal counselors—both inside counsel and
outside attorneys—to ask themselves, “would the boss want to know this?”
and “why am I not telling him?” In addition to these pragmatic concerns,
Broad & Narrow should report both instances of wrongdoing as a matter of
ethics for ethics’ own sake. Whether one characterizes this final thought as
an imperative of moral philosophy, faith-based values, or golden-rule eth-
ics, reporting up-the-ladder is, in this case, simply the right thing to do.48
Given the nature of the violations of law in the hypothetical, both in-
stances of wrongdoing should be addressed to Acme, Inc. By adopting the
narrow interpretation of “related to representation,” Broad & Narrow can
show that they are trustworthy team players, capable of keeping secrets,
while simultaneously demonstrating that they are ethically aware and cogni-
zant of their duty to maintain a level of independence. The draft comment
that follows seeks to clarify ambiguity existing because of the use of the
similar language in Rules 1.6 and 1.13. With it, Broad & Narrow will have
a surer understanding of how to act.
VII. DRAFT COMMENT
I propose this addition to Comment 6 to Rule 1.13 “Relation to Other
Rules”: In some instances, a lawyer may possess knowledge that is “infor-
mation relating to the representation” such that Rule 1.6(a) requires confi-
dentiality but is not sufficiently related to the services a lawyer provides for
the organization that the knowledge is of a “matter related to the representa-
tion” under Rule 1.13(b), even if it otherwise fulfills the Rule 1.13(b) pre-
requisites.  In these circumstances, the decision to voluntarily refer the
matter to a higher authority in the organization is a matter of professional
judgment ordinarily reserved to the lawyer.
47. See id. at 367–68 n.41.
48. See id. at 383–84 n.145.
